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Germany v. Italy and the
Limits of Horizontal
Enforcement
Some Reflections from a United States Perspective
Chime' ne I. Keitner*
Abstract
This contribution considers the implications of the decision of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v.
Italy: Greece Intervening) for the evolution of structural norms relating to the im-
munity of foreign states in domestic courts, with a focus on the practice of the
United States. It also considers whether the decision, which is explicitly limited to
the question of state immunity, might nevertheless affect domestic courts’ willing-
ness to recognize the immunity of officials who act on behalf of foreign states. It con-
cludes that the state-centric nature of Germany’s challenge to Italy’s exercise of
jurisdiction underscores the conceptual and doctrinal distinction between foreign
state immunity, on the one hand, and foreign official immunity, on the other. This
distinction is critical to legitimizing the horizontal enforcement of those substantive
rules of international law that are binding on individuals and designed to protect
other individuals from harms inflicted under colour of state authority.
1. Introduction
The decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening) (‘Germany v.
Italy’) represents a particularly interesting instance of international dispute
resolution in which the parties asked the Court to identify and apply what
might be called structural rather than substantive principles of customary
* Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of Law. [keitnerc@uchastings.edu]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Journal of International Criminal Justice 11 (2013), 167^183 doi:10.1093/jicj/mqs087
 Oxford University Press, 2012, All rights reserved.
For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
Advance Access publication 21 December 2012
 at U
C H
astings Law
 Library on June 24, 2015
http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
international law. Germany and Italy, and Greece as an intervener, agreed that
German forces committed egregious violations of international humanitarian
law during the Second World War. The question was whether Italy violated
customary international law by exercising its adjudicatory and enforcement
jurisdiction to enable victims to seek compensation from Germany absent
Germany’s consent to waive its sovereign immunity. In other words, the ICJ
was asked to determine whether Italy’s attempt to enforce international law
horizontally was itself unlawful.
Substantive rules of international law govern the conduct of individuals, and
of states and other entities on behalf of which individuals act. In the field
of international criminal law, states play a critical role as horizontal enforcers
of substantive rules, whether they are accorded a primary enforcement role,
as in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), or a residual
enforcement role, as in the United Nations Security Council resolutions creat-
ing the two ad hoc tribunals, the international criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. Structural principles of international law
must balance the need to constrain the disruptive potential of unilateral
action by states with the critical role of states in defining and applying sub-
stantive international legal rules. Structural rules, including jurisdictional
immunities, allocate the authority to regulate conduct horizontally among
states. I use the term ‘horizontal enforcement’ to denote the use of one state’s
judicial machinery to enforce international conduct-regulating rules binding
on other states and their agents.
This contribution considers the implications of the ICJ’s decision for the
evolution of structural norms relating to the immunity of foreign states in
domestic courts, with a focus on the practice of the United States. It also
considers whether the decision, which is explicitly limited to the question of
state immunity, might nevertheless affect domestic courts’ willingness to
recognize the immunity of officials who act on behalf of foreign states. It con-
cludes that the state-centric nature of Germany’s challenge to Italy’s exercise
of jurisdiction underscores the conceptual and doctrinal distinction between
foreign state immunity, on the one hand, and foreign official immunity, on the
other. This distinction is critical to legitimizing the horizontal enforcement of
those substantive rules of international law that are binding on individuals
and designed to protect other individuals from harms inflicted under colour
of state authority.
2. A Note on Structural Principles
The process of contestation that defines the content of substantive rules of
international law also shapes the structural principles that sovereign states
observe in their mutual interactions. At the time of writing, the US Supreme
Court was preparing to address the question whether United States courts
should recognize a civil cause of action for violations of the law of nations
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occurring in the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.1 The
defendant argued, among other things, that permitting such suits constitutes
an internationally unlawful exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the
United States.2 This argument invokes structural limitations on the ability of
states to enforce substantive international law rules horizontally.
Jurisdictional principles allocate the authority to prescribe, adjudicate and
enforce conduct regulating rules. Even if jurisdiction to adjudicate or enforce
exists, immunities recognized by states as a matter of customary international
law may constrain the exercise of this jurisdiction by national courts. The ICJ’s
judgment in Germany v. Italy, which found that Italy violated international
law by allowing civil claims to proceed against Germany for war crimes com-
mitted in Italy or against Italians during the Second World War, articulates
the rationale for state immunity from adjudicatory and enforcement jurisdic-
tion in the context of resolving postwar reparations claims. Viewed more
broadly, the majority’s analysis provides an opportunity to explore two issues
relevant to the enforcement of international law by US courts: the customary
international law status of state immunity; and the relationship between state
immunity and immunities that may be available to individuals who act on the
state’s behalf. This contribution addresses each of these issues in turn.
3. State Immunity as a Rule of Customary
International Law
The ICJ’s vertical authority to adjudicate the dispute between Germany
and Italy depended on the question presented being governed by international
law. The court noted that ‘both Parties agree that immunity is governed
by international law and is not a mere matter of comity’.3 According to
the Court, the principle of sovereign equality of states gives rise both to the
1 For a brief overview, see C.I. Keitner, ‘The Reargument Order in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
and Its Potential Implications for Transnational Human Rights Cases’, 16 American Society of
International Law Insight, 21 March 2012, available online at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/
insight120321.pdf (visited 20 July 2012).
2 The Executive Branch of the US government, represented by the Department of Justice, did not
endorse the position that ‘an extraterritorial private cause of action would violate international
law in this case’, but it advocated against creating such a cause of action ‘solely [as an issue]
of the allocation of responsibility among the Branches of the United States Government for cre-
ation of private rights of action under U.S. law’. See Supreme Court of the United States,
Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of Affirmance,
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 10-1491, June 2012, at 14, available online at http://sblog.
s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Kiobel-US-supp-brief-6-13-12.pdf (visited 20
July 2012).
3 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), International Court of
Justice (ICJ), Judgment of 3 February 2012, x 53, available online at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/143/16883.pdf (visited 20 July 2012) (‘Judgment’).
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principle of territorial sovereignty and to the legal requirement of state
immunity:
[T]he rule of State immunity :::derives from the principle of sovereign equality of States,
which, as Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations makes clear, is
one of the fundamental principles of the international legal order. This principle has to
be viewed together with the principle that each State possesses sovereignty over its own
territory and that there flows from that sovereignty the jurisdiction of the State over
events and persons within that territory. Exceptions to the immunity of the State represent
a departure from the principle of sovereign equality. Immunity may represent a departure
from the principle of territorial sovereignty and the jurisdiction which flows from it.4
The court did not cite Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall’s 1812 opin-
ion inThe Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, which is often invoked to underscore
the connection between sovereign equality and state immunity, but Germany
cited this foundational US decision in its memorial.5 However, Germany de-
emphasized the discussion inThe Schooner Exchange of the principle of territor-
ial sovereignty, which Chief Justice Marshall found ç and the ICJ agreed ç
flows equally from the principle of sovereign equality. The tension between
territorial sovereignty and state immunity seems particularly acute where, as
here, much of the wrongful conduct took place on the forum state’s territory.6
The Schooner Exchange involved the exercise of in rem jurisdiction over a
French public ship of war that docked in the port of Philadelphia in order to
seek ‘refreshments and repairs’.7 Two Americans who claimed to be the ship’s
rightful owners sought to have the ship returned to them. In finding the ship
immune from legal process, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that the
US Supreme Court was ‘exploring an unbeaten path, with few, if any, aids
from precedents or written law, [making] it necessary to rely much on general
principles, and on a train of reasoning, founded on cases in some degree analo-
gous to this’.8 The court was persuaded that the ship was entitled to immunity
analogous to the ratione personae immunity granted to heads of state and
foreign ministers, as well as the guarantee of safe conduct for the passage of
friendly foreign troops (a precursor to today’s status of forces agreements),
both of which are based on the express or implied consent of the territorial sov-
ereign.9 The court was also doubtless influenced by the desire to avoid provok-
ing a conflict with France just three months before the United States officially
declared war against Great Britain, in a classic example of the deep influence
of international relations on the elucidation of principles of international law.
4 Ibid., x57.
5 Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, Germany v. Italy, 12 June 2009, x 48, available
online at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16644.pdf (visited 20 July 2012) (‘Memorial of
the Federal Republic of Germany’).
6 See the contribution byAndrew Dickinson in this issue of the Journal.
7 The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812), 7 Cranch 116 (‘The Schooner Exchange’).
8 Ibid., at 136.
9 Ibid., at 137^141.
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Two centuries later, Germany and Italy presented similar arguments to the
ICJ based on ‘general principles’ and ‘analogous’ cases, in the shadow of con-
cerns about the disruptive potential of affording legal sanction to unilateral ju-
dicial action by states in the aftermath of war. Consistent with its mandate,
the ICJ set out to identify the applicable rule of customary international law,
if any, created by the requisite uniformity of state practice and opinio juris.
Italy argued that the egregious nature of Germany’s conduct, combined with
the fact that much of its conduct occurred on Italian soil, warranted the
denial of state immunity in the circumstances; Germany countered that
the context in which the conduct was performed required elevating the prin-
ciple of immunity over the principle of territorial sovereignty,10 and that no
exceptions to state immunity for public acts (acta jure imperii) had achieved
the status of customary international law.
The ICJ was persuaded by Germany’s emphasis on the special circumstances
of armed conflict, and on the characterization of Germany’s conduct as acta
jure imperii entitled, by definition, to state immunity. When acta jure imperii
(public acts of the state) and acta jure gestionis (private or commercial acts of
the state) are the only two available categories, it is difficult to avoid character-
izing war crimes as anything other than acta jure imperii. The prevailing
binary classification of acts performed by states thus determined the result of
the ICJ’s enquiry.11 The majority observed:
The acts of the German armed forces and other State organs which were the subject of the
proceedings in the Italian courts clearly constituted acta jure imperii. The Court notes that
Italy, in response to a question posed by a member of the Court, recognized that those acts
had to be characterized as acta jure imperii, notwithstanding that they were unlawful.12
Because, in the majority’s view, Germany’s acts ‘had to be’characterized in this
manner, the burden shifted to Italy to demonstrate the existence of a custom-
ary international law norm denying state immunity for war crimes committed
on the forum state’s territory, which Italy proved unable to do.13
As PhilippaWebb has suggested, Italy’s failure to persuade the ICJ that such
an exception to state immunity currently exists will likely impact the future
10 Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, x 71, arguing that the so-called ‘territorial tort’
exception was never intended to apply to situations of armed conflict.
11 Andrea Bianchi has argued against this binary categorization, proposing a tertium genus for
grave human rights violations. See A. Bianchi, ‘L’immunite¤ des e¤ tats et les violations graves
des droits de l’homme: la fonction de l’interpre' te dans la de¤ termination du droit international’,
108 Revue ge¤ ne¤ rale de droit international public (2004) 63, at 72^73.
12 Judgment, x 60. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht noted in 1951 that ‘the state always acts as a public
person. It cannot act otherwise. In a real sense all acts jure gestionis are acts jure imperii’. See
H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States’, 28 British Year
Book of International Law (1951) 220, at 224. Particularly in light of the evolution of the restrict-
ive theory, the conclusion that all acts jure imperii necessarily benefit from absolute immunity
appears somewhat tautological.
13 On the potentially decisive effect of framing in the context of immunity determinations, see
C.I. Keitner, ‘Foreign Official Immunity and the ‘‘Baseline’’ Problem’, 80 Fordham Law Review
(2011) 605.
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development of customary international law, since it will have a ‘chilling effect’
on national courts that might otherwise have generated additional state prac-
tice and opinio juris narrowing the scope of foreign state immunity over
time.14 The ICJ’s decision will thus curtail the horizontal enforcement of cer-
tain substantive rules of international law where the defendant is a foreign
state by making it more difficult (that is, less plausible in doctrinal terms and
more costly in political terms) for domestic courts to deny assertions of state
immunity.
The inevitability of the outcome in Germany v. Italy should not be overstated.
Dissenting Judge Canc¸ado Trindade disagreed with the majority’s characteriza-
tion of international crimes (delicta imperii) as acts jure imperii. In his view,
‘[s]uch crime is not an act jure imperii nor an act jure gestionis: it is an interna-
tional crime, irrespective of whom committed it, engaging both State and indi-
vidual responsibility.’15 He asked: ‘How can war crimes be considered as acts
jure ç I repeat jure ç imperii?’16 For him, the focus on imperii obscures the
concept of jure that lies at the centre of an international order designed to pro-
tect human beings, not just the interests of states.17
No doubt, denying immunity solely on the ground of unlawfulness makes
little sense, because immunity exists in part to shield a defendant from deter-
minations of lawfulness or lack thereof by certain categories of decision
makers. However, although it may be true that, as the majority reasoned, deny-
ing immunity on the ground of the egregious nature of the alleged conduct
could be problematic because of the risk of defeating immunity by ‘skilful con-
struction of the claim’,18 mechanisms such as limited jurisdictional discovery
and heightened pleading standards can attenuate this risk.
Eliminating the possibility of horizontal enforcement through judicial chan-
nels will compel individuals who are harmed by the actions of foreign states
to rely once again on diplomatic protection and the discretionary espousal
and settlement of claims by their home state, in the absence of accessible verti-
cal enforcement mechanisms.19 Individuals who are harmed by the actions of
their own state will have to rely on local remedies, in the absence of vertical
alternatives.
From the perspective of the international system, if substantive rules of
international law are intended to affect the behaviour of states, then
14 P.Webb, ‘The International Court of Justice’s Judgment in Germany v. Italy: A Chilling Effect?’
iLawyer: A Blog on International Justice, 17 March 2012, available online at http://ilawyer-
blog.com/the-international-court-of-justices-judgment-in-germany-v-italy-a-chilling-effect/
(visited 20 July 2012).
15 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Canc¸ado Trindade, Germany v. Italy, Judgment of 3 February 2012,
x 193, available online at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16891.pdf (visited 20 July
2012). See also ibid., xx129, 354, 290, 306, rejecting this characterization.
16 Ibid., x 80.
17 See ibid., x160, rejecting an approach ‘confined to the paradigm of inter-State relations’.
18 Judgment, x82. See the contribution by Giuseppe Nesi in this issue of the Journal.
19 For a critique of the adequacy of diplomatic protection as an alternative means of settlement,
see L. McGregor, ‘Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty’,
18 European Journal of International Law (2009) 903, at 908^911.
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categorically denying the possibility of horizontal enforcement seems incom-
patible with a desire to increase the probability of deterring and punishing
non-compliance. The majority’s reasoning fails to grapple with the systemic
costs of state immunity (although it acknowledges the individual costs) and
focuses instead on the disruptive potential of horizontal enforcement. The ma-
jority could have offered a more candid assessment of the inadequacy of exist-
ing mechanisms to deter and punish unlawful state behaviour, even if it
ultimately reached the same conclusion regarding Germany’s entitlement to
immunity in the circumstances.
Unlike Italian (and Greek) courts, which evaluated Germany’s claims to state
immunity as a matter of customary international law, US courts are bound to
apply the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). Under the FSIA, a
US court cannot obtain either subject matter or personal jurisdiction over a
foreign state unless a statutory exception to immunity applies.20 Although the
FSIA currently governs determinations of state immunity in US courts, Chief
Justice Marshall’s common law reasoning in The Schooner Exchange still figures
in judicial opinions. For example, in its 2004 decision in Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, the Supreme Court recalled Chief Justice Marshall’s observation that
US courts will recognize ratione personae immunity because ‘as a matter of
comity, members of the international community had implicitly agreed to
waive the exercise of [their plenary territorial] jurisdiction over other sover-
eigns in certain classes of cases, such as those involving foreign ministers or
the person of the sovereign’.21 This observation highlights the functional ra-
tionale for recognizing immunity in ‘certain classes of cases’ that might inter-
fere with the conduct of foreign relations.
Both Altmann and The Schooner Exchange have been cited for the broader
proposition that immunity is treated as a matter of ‘comity’ in US law. From
the perspective of international law, the idea of ‘comity’ (a word that does not
appear in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion, but that does appear in Justice
Joseph Story’s later opinion in The Santissima Trinidad)22 has been contrasted
with the idea of a binding legal obligation, as in the ICJ’s admonition in
Germany v. Italy that ‘immunity ::: is not a mere matter of comity’.23 In US judi-
cial opinions, however, the more pertinent contrast is between matters of
comity and matters of constitutional law, since the former might be considered
largely the province of the Executive Branch, whereas the latter fall squarely
within the competence of courts.24 The practice of the United States with
regard to state immunity cannot be divorced entirely from a discussion of the
evolving standards of customary international law in this area. It is thus
20 SeeArgentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation, 488 U.S. 428 (1989), at 435;Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983), at 485.
21 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), at 688 (‘Republic of Austria v. Altmann’).
22 The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283 (1822), at 353, discussed in D.L. Sloss, M.D. Ramsey and
W.S. Dodge (eds), International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court: Continuity and Change
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 40.
23 Judgment, x53.
24 See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, at 688^690.
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curious that the ICJ cited national court decisions upholding immunity for
international crimes (including decisions that applied relevant state immunity
acts) from courts in Canada, France, Slovenia, New Zealand, Poland and the
United Kingdom, but did not cite the US Supreme Court’s decision in Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson, which found state immunity under the FSIA for allegations
of torture.25
When he wrote the Court’s 1812 opinion in The Schooner Exchange, Chief
Justice Marshall did not use the term ‘law of nations’, but he did place great
weight on the ‘usages’ of the ‘civilized world’ and the ‘faith’ that such usages
will be followed. He observed:
A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that faith might not be
expressly plighted, which should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territor-
ial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized
world.26
Germany’s complaint against Italy resonates with Marshall’s idea of a violation
of ‘faith’, particularly since Germany argued that Italy had explicitly renounced
further claims on behalf of Italian nationals in its 1947 peace treaty and two
1961 agreements with Germany.
In 1812, France benefited from the horizontal self-restraint of the US
Supreme Court; when Italy failed to exercise self-restraint two centuries later,
Germany invoked the vertical dispute resolution authority of the ICJ. The ICJ,
in turn, referenced ‘a century of practice in which almost every peace treaty
or post-war settlement has involved either a decision not to require the pay-
ment of reparations or the use of lump sum settlements and set-offs’.27 Viewed
in this light, the ICJ’s sharp contrast between ‘international law’ and ‘mere
comity’ seems somewhat overstated; rather, like Chief Justice Marshall, the
court relied in part on the long standing ‘usages’ of countries agreeing to post-
war lump sum settlements to determine that Germany could ‘justly [consider
Italy] as violating its faith’. Both the Supreme Court in The Schooner Exchange
and the ICJ in Germany v. Italy put great weight on their perception of the legit-
imate expectations of relevant actors, based on established patterns of beha-
viour. Their judicial opinions, in turn, helped crystallize these expectations
into binding legal rules.
The ICJ’s opinion emphasized the special nature of armed conflict in deter-
mining that Italian courts did not have authority to engage in the horizontal
adjudication and enforcement of Germany’s postwar obligations, although
the question of reparations could appropriately form ‘the subject of further
25 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993). In a string citation of national court decisions, the
ICJ did not differentiate between the decisions of lower courts and supreme courts and left it
unclear whether the cited decisions are meant to be illustrative or constitutive of customary
international law. The citation was used to show that a number of national courts have rejected
the argument that jus cogens norms are ‘hierarchically’ superior to norms of state or official
immunity. Judgment, x96.
26 The Schooner Exchange, at 137.
27 Judgment, x94.
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negotiation involving the two States concerned, with a view to resolving
the issue’.28 The ICJ, the paradigmatic vertical enforcer of international law, re-
directed Italy’s efforts at dispute resolution from (unilateral) horizontal adjudi-
cation to (bilateral) diplomacy to determine the consequences of Germany’s
internationally unlawful conduct.29
Although Chief Justice Marshall’s 1812 opinion remains talismanic, the
United States does not always exercise restraint on questions of state immunity.
This is perhaps why the ICJ chose not to cite US practice in this area, even
when US practice supported the ICJ’s conclusions. Notably, Italy referred in its
submissions to a 1996 amendment to the FSIA that removes state immunity
for certain acts committed by designated state sponsors of terrorism, to support
its argument that state practice does not uniformly recognize state immunity
for all non-commercial acts. The ICJ dismissed the relevance of the US legisla-
tion on the grounds that ‘this amendment has no counterpart in the legislation
of other States’,30 and because the amendment removes immunity on the
basis of the identity of the defendant rather than ‘on the grounds of the gravity
of the acts alleged’.31 The ICJ refrained, however, from commenting on the law-
fulness of the state sponsors of terrorism exception, which denies immunity
for certain acts jure imperii committed by particular states singled out as a
matter of US foreign policy.
Judgments entered by US courts under the state sponsors of terrorism provi-
sion amount to hundreds of millions of dollars.32 Although Germany is correct
28 Ibid., x104.
29 Because Italy did not advance arguments based on the commercial activity exception to state
immunity, the ICJ did not engage the question of the appropriate contours of this exception.
The point is not merely academic; much of the Holocaust litigation in US courts, which
prompted a diplomatic settlement of claims, was brought against private corporations that did
not benefit from state immunity. See e.g. A. Bianchi, ‘Serious Violations of Human Rights and
Foreign States’ Accountability Before Municipal Courts’, in L.C. Vohrah et al. (eds), Man’s
Inhumanity to Man: Essays in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Kluwer Law International, 2003) 149,
at 180, noting the role of United States Holocaust litigation in motivating settlements. At the
time of writing, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was considering whether Holocaust vic-
tims could sue Hungarian State Railways under the expropriation exception to the United
States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), in an appeal of the decision inVictims of the
Hungarian Holocaust v. Hungarian State Railways (798 F. Supp. 2d 934 (2011)). Some have advo-
cated legislative action to permit such suits to proceed, following the dismissal of similar suits
against the French SNCF. See A. Ramonas, ‘Relentless Pursuit of Justice for Survivors:
Undeterred by Setbacks in Court, Akin Gump Takes Holocaust Reparations to Congress’, The
National Law Journal, 2 January 2012, available online at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id¼1202537061485&slreturn¼1 (visited 20 July 2012).
30 Judgment, x 88. In fact, Canada recently amended its State Immunity Act to provide a similar
exception for state sponsors of terrorism. See ‘An Act to enact the Justice for Victims of
Terrorism Act and to amend the State Immunity Act’, 13 March 2012, available online at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language¼E&Mode¼1&DocId¼
5465759&File¼53#8 (visited 20 July 2012).
31 Judgment, x88.
32 For a recent example, see United States District Court for the District of Columbia,Wultz v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, Judgment No. 08-cv-1460 (RCL), 14 May 2012, available online at
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2008cv1460-134 (visited 20 July 2012), in
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that ‘a unilateral act of U.S. legislation is not capable of changing international
law’,33 this does not mean that customary international law can never
change. For the time being, however, particularly in light of the ICJ’s decision,
it seems that structural norms recognizing state immunity for public acts will
endure, at least among friends.
4. The Relationship Between State Immunity and
Foreign Official Immunities
The ICJ’s decision in Germany v. Italy explicitly declines to address the question
of individual immunities and ‘address[es] only the immunity of the State itself
from the jurisdiction of the courts of other States’.34 It thus solidifies the con-
ceptual and doctrinal distinction between foreign state immunity and foreign
official immunities. Both categories involve structural principles of interna-
tional law, but the latter also involves the imposition of personal responsibility
on individuals who commit egregious acts in the name of foreign states.
The imposition of personal responsibility on individuals flows from the obser-
vation that, as famously proclaimed at Nuremberg, ‘[c]rimes against interna-
tional law are committed by men [and women], not by abstract entities’.35
Jurisdictional immunities do not absolve individual officials from such personal
responsibility. As Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, observed in
their joint separate opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, ‘it is generally recog-
nized that in the case of [serious international] crimes, which are often com-
mitted by high officials who make use of the power invested in the State,
immunity is never substantive and thus cannot exculpate the offender from
personal criminal responsibility’.36 Jurisdictional immunities allocate the
authority to determine the existence of personal responsibility and to impose
consequences on the wrongdoer.
The relatively greater tolerance for horizontal enforcement of substantive
international law rules that assign personal responsibility to individuals (as
opposed to states) can be seen, for example, in Germany’s apparent decision
not to challenge Italy’s conviction in absentia of Max Josef Milde, a former
which Judge Royce Lamberth wrote that ‘[w]hen a state chooses to use terror as a policy tool ç
as Iran and Syria continue to do ç that state forfeits its sovereign immunity and deserves un-
adorned condemnation’. Ibid., at 29.
33 Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, x68.
34 See Judgment, x91.
35 Judgment, United States et al. v. Goering et al., International Military Tribunal, 30 September
1946, in 2 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal
(19461947), available online at http://www.uniset.ca/other/cs4/6FRD69.html (visited 20 July
2012).
36 Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, ArrestWarrant of 11April
2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, x 74, avail-
able online at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8136.pdf (visited 20 July 2012) (‘Joint
Separate Opinion’).
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member of the so-called ‘Hermann Go« ring’division, for a 1944 massacre in the
Tuscan town of Civitella.37 Distinguishing between state immunity, on the
one hand, and conduct-based immunity for individual officials, on the other,
opens up space for states to contemplate more robust forms of horizontal
enforcement where the subject of legal proceedings is the responsible individ-
ual, rather than a foreign state.
Proceedings against individual officials are subject to important constraints.
Notably, status-based immunities (ratione personae) shield certain incumbent
officials from foreign jurisdiction in order to facilitate the conduct of interna-
tional relations. These immunities bar both civil and criminal proceedings.
Conduct-based immunities (ratione materiae) also shield certain governmental
acts from judicial scrutiny in foreign courts. The parameters of conduct-based
immunities remain contested. The International Law Commission’s consider-
ation of the topic to date has failed to produce a consensus view.38 The 2004
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, which is not yet in force, defines ‘state’ to include ‘representatives of
the state acting in that capacity’, and would therefore shield individual officials
from civil (but not criminal) liability for official acts.39 Others have taken the
position that international crimes can never constitute official acts for immun-
ity purposes because, as Yoram Dinstein has explained, ‘whatever the range of
functions assigned to an office-holder by his or her State, they never included
the commission of international crimes. Thus, the person concerned could
not argue that his or her functional immunity covered the perpetration of
international crimes’.40 Embracing the latter approach, the Institut de droit
international adopted a resolution in 2009 that, where the defendant in
civil or criminal proceedings is a person who acted on behalf of a state, ‘[n]o
immunity from jurisdiction other than personal [ratione personae] immunity
37 See A. Ciampi, ‘The Italian Court of Cassation Asserts Civil Jurisdiction Over Germany in a
Criminal Case Relating to the Second World War’, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice
(2009) 597. Perhaps contemplating a similar distinction, the German Federal Constitutional
Court held in a 1997 decision involving an arrest warrant for the former Ambassador of Syria
that ‘state immunity becomes effective only if a state ‘‘as such’’ is a party to a judicial dispute’.
See S. v. Berlin Court of Appeal and District Court of Berlin-Tiergarten, 24 Europaische
Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 436, 10 June 1997, at Section B II, x 3(a)(ee); and the case note in
B. Fassbender, 92 American Journal of International Law (1998) 74, at 77.
38 See International Law Commission, Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction,
Report of the Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (2011), at Chapter VII, available online at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2011/2011report.htm (visited 20 July 2012).
39 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, adopted
2 December 2004, GA Res. 59/38, 2 December 2004, annex, not yet in force. The Convention
does not apply to criminal proceedings. See GA Res. 59/38, 16 December 2004.
40 J. Salmon, ‘La re¤ solution de Naples de l’Institut de droit international sur les immunite¤ s de
juridiction de l’E¤ tat et de ses agents en cas de crimes internationaux (10 September 2009)’,
152 Revue belge de droit international (2009) 316, at 329.When asked to vote on this proposition,
37 members of a commission of the Institut de droit international voted in favor, none voted
against, and six abstained.
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in accordance with international law applies with regard to international
crimes.’41
In practice, some domestic courts have denied ratione materiae (conduct-
based) immunity from criminal proceedings for international crimes com-
mitted under colour of foreign law,42 and some domestic courts have also
denied conduct-based immunity from civil proceedings.43 Consequently, coun-
tries whose officials might risk prosecution or suit in foreign courts have
made more expansive claims to ratione personae (status-based) immunity,
including ‘special mission’ immunity, for their officials, and they have also chal-
lenged the procedures by which prosecutions or suits are initiated.44
To the extent that conduct-based immunities serve to allocate adjudicatory
authority horizontally among states, the form of the proceedings seems imma-
terial: the point is that one state’s judicial machinery is being used to review
conduct performed on behalf of another state. Moreover, some countries
permit private parties to initiate criminal proceedings, and others allow private
parties to claim damages in conjunction with criminal proceeding. These vari-
ations in national legal systems challenge the notion that one set of immunity
rules applies in the criminal context, whereas another set applies in the civil
context.
In the Arrest Warrant Case, the ICJ grounded its finding of ratione personae
immunity for an incumbent foreign minister in a functional analysis, holding
that the occupant of that office is entitled to protection ‘against any act of
41 Resolution on the Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of PersonsWho Act on Behalf of the
State in case of International Crimes, September 2009, available online at http://www.idi-iil.org/
idiE/resolutionsE/2009_naples_01_en.pdf (visited 20 July 2012).
42 See e.g. Swiss Federal Criminal Court, BB.20.11.140, Decision of 25 July 2012, available online
at http://www.trial-ch.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/affaires/algeria/BB.2011.140.pdf
(visited 20 July 2012), concerning the denial of immunity for war crimes in privately initiated
criminal prosecution; United States Eleventh Circuit of Appeal, United States v. Belfast (611 F.3d
783 (2010)), at 793, 808, concerning denial of immunity for torture; United Kingdom House of
Lords, Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3) [2000] 1 A.C. 147, an appeal taken from England concerning
the denial of immunity for torture; see also C.A. Bradley and L.R. Helfer, ‘International Law
and the U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity’, 2010 Supreme Court Review 213, at
238, indicating that ‘a growing number of international and national courts have abrogated
the conduct immunity of former heads of state as well as current and former lower-level offi-
cials from criminal investigations and prosecutions for jus cogens violations’.
43 On US practice, see B. Stephens, ‘Abusing the Authority of the State: Denying Foreign Official
Immunity for Egregious Human Rights Abuses’, 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
(Vand. JTL) (2011) 1163, at 1177; B. Stephens, ‘The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official
Immunity’, 79 Fordham Law Review (2011) 2669, at 2680^2682. In contrast, the UK House of
Lords found ratione materiae immunity from civil proceedings for torture under the United
Kingdom State Immunity Act in a decision that is currently being challenged before the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). See ECtHR, Jones v. United Kingdom, Appl.
Nos 34356/06 & 40528/06 (2009), at 1427. For more on Jones and cases that have followed its
approach, see Keitner, supra note 13.
44 For example, the United Kingdom has recently modified the procedures for seeking arrest
warrants in conjunction with private prosecutions. See Anonymous, ‘International Law ç
Universal Jurisdiction ç United Kingdom Adds Barrier to Private Prosecution of Universal
Jurisdiction Crimes’, 125 Harvard Law Review (2012) 1554.
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authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the performance
of his or her duties’.45 Unlike ratione materiae immunity, ratione personae
immunity from foreign legal processes must be absolute because ‘[t]he conse-
quences of such impediment to the exercise of those official functions are
equally serious, regardless of whether ::: the arrest relates to alleged acts
performed in an ‘‘official’’capacity or a ‘‘private’’capacity’.46 The ICJ emphasized
in obiter dicta that ‘[j]urisdictional immunity ::: cannot exonerate the person
to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility’,47 and that, for example,
‘[p]rovided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one
State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect
of acts committed ::: during [his or her] period of office in a private capacity’.48
However, the ICJ did not specify what it meant by ‘private capacity’, or whether
the examples of the absence of applicable immunities were intended to be ex-
haustive. Jean Salmon has lamented the ICJ’s use of the term ‘private capacity’
in the Arrest Warrant case, calling it ‘l’e¤ le¤ phant dans le magasin de porcelain’
[the elephant in the porcelain shop].49 The systematic use of state violence
does not naturally fall within what one might think of as an official’s ‘private
capacity’, yet the acceptance of criminal proceedings against individual
officials for international crimes that involve the use of state power illustrates
that official acts are not universally considered immune from horizontal
enforcement. The ICJ was careful to bracket the question of individual official
immunity in its Germany v. Italy judgment, emphasizing that ‘the question of
whether, and if so to what extent, immunity might apply in criminal proceed-
ings against an official of the State is not in issue in the present case’.50
As indicated above, Germany apparently did not object to criminal proceed-
ings in Italy against its former official Max Josef Milde for his involvement in
the Civitella massacre. Germany did, however, object to Italy’s imposition of
joint and several liability on Germany as the responsabile civile for Milde’s ac-
tions at the request of victims who intervened as civil parties in the criminal
proceeding.51 Germany’s objection to being brought into the criminal proceed-
ing is consistent with a line of decisions in civil suits in the 19th and early
20th century that found immunity where plaintiffs sought the assets of the
state, even if the state was not the named defendant.52 Consistent with this
45 ArrestWarrant of 11April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), International Court
of Justice, 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports (2002) 3, at 22.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., at 25.
48 Ibid.
49 J. Salmon,‘Libres propos sur l’arre“ t de la C.I.J. du14 fe¤ vrier 2002 dans l’affaire relative au mandat
d’arre“ t du 11 avril 2000 (R.D.C. c. Belgique)’, 35 Revue belge de droit international (2002) 512,
at 517.
50 Judgment, x91.
51 See Ciampi, supra note 37, at 600.
52 These cases include: UK House of Lords, Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad [1958] A.C.379, finding
a suit that named the former High Commissioner of Pakistan as a defendant was barred by sover-
eign immunity because it involved determining Pakistan’s entitlement to funds held in a
London bank account; UK House of Lords, Compania Naviera Vascongada v. Steamship Cristina
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reasoning, the US Supreme Court noted in its unanimous 2010 decision in
Samatar that there might be instances in which the state is the ‘real party in
interest’ in proceedings that are nominally brought against a state official.53
Under US law, if the state is the real party in interest then the state’s immunity
is governed by the FSIA, and it might turn out that there is simply no cause
of action against the individual.54 In Samantar, Somalia was not the real party
in interest because the plaintiffs sued former Somali Defence Minister
Mohamed Ali Samantar ‘in his personal capacity and s[ought] damages from
his own pockets’.55 The US State Department advised that Samantar did not
benefit from ratione materiae immunity for torture in the circumstances,56
and the trial court agreed.57
Unless the state’s assets are sought in the proceedings, thereby making the
state the real party in interest, the issue in both criminal and civil proceedings
[1938] A.C. 485, specifying, in a judgment by Lord Atkin, that courts will not seek ‘specific prop-
erty or damages’ from a foreign sovereign, and will not ‘seize or detain property which is his,
or of which he is in possession or control’; UK Court of Appeal, Twycross v. Dreyfus [1877]
5 Ch.D. 605, finding lack of jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claim to the proceeds of the sale
of guano owned by the Republic of Peru because the Republic was a necessary party as
the owner of the guano; United Kingdom House of Lords, Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover
[1848] 9 E.R. 993, refusing to inquire into the legality of the appointment of a guardian for
the management of the Duke of Brunswick’s property, under the laws of Brunswick and
Hanover.
53 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010), at 2292 (‘Samantar’).
54 In cases involving commercial transactions, Lady Hazel Fox has observed that a court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign official ‘not because the official is immune ç there being
no applicable immunity for this type of transaction ç but because the law attributes responsi-
bility to the State and not to the official’. See H. Fox, ‘Imputability and Immunity as Separate
Concepts: The Removal of Immunity from Civil Proceedings Relating to the Commission of an
International Crime’, in K.H. Kaikobad and M. Bohlander (eds), International Law and Power:
Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice, Essays in Honour of Colin Warbrick (Brill, 2009) 165, at
172^173.
55 Samantar, supra note 53, at 2292.
56 Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Samantar v.Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010),
available online at http://cja.org/downloads/StateDepon%20Samantar.pdf (visited 20 July
2012).
57 In denying a motion for reconsideration of the order denying immunity, the trial judge indi-
cated: ‘The Executive Branch has spoken on this issue and that they are entitled to a great
deal of deference. They don’t control but they are entitled to deference in this case.’ Transcript
of order denying motion for reconsideration, Yousuf v. Samantar, 1:04 CV 1360, 1 April 2011,
available online at http://www.cja.org/downloads/Samantar-Docket-Entry-158b---transcript-
of-order-denying-MTN-for-reconsideration.pdf (visited 20 July 2012). Samantar defaulted, and
the district court entered a $21 million judgment in favour of the plaintiffs. See Memorandum
Opinion, Yousuf v. Samantar, 1:04 CV 1360, 28 August 2012, available online at http://cja.org/
downloads/Samantar%20Final%20Judgment.pdf (visited 20 July 2012). As this contribution
was going to press, the Fourth Circuit issued a decision affirming the denial of conduct-based
immunity on the grounds that ‘under international and domestic law, officials from other coun-
tries are not entitled to foreign official immunity for jus cogens violations, even if the acts
were performed in the defendant’s official capacity.’ Yousuf v. Samantar, 4th Cir. Court of
Appeals No. 11-1479, 2 November 2012, slip op. at 21^22, available online at http://
www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/111479.P.pdf (visited 20 November 2012).
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is the legitimacy of a foreign state’s assertion of authority over individual con-
duct that occurred under colour of foreign law. Unlike Italy, the United States
does not generally permit the intervention of civil parties in criminal proceed-
ings. Instead, victims of human rights and humanitarian law violations have
filed civil suits in US courts against current and former foreign officials for
acts performed under colour of state authority. In Samantar, the Supreme
Court held that, where an immunity defence has been raised by the defendant
and not waived by the foreign state, the common law will govern the defend-
ant’s entitlement to assert immunity where the foreign state is not an indis-
pensable party or the real party in interest.58
In rejecting Samantar’s argument that the FSIA entitled him to immunity
from suit, the Supreme Court observed:
[Samantar] argues that because state and official immunities are coextensive, Congress
must have codified official immunity when it codified state immunity. But the relationship
between a state’s immunity and an official’s immunity is more complicated than petitioner
suggests, although we need not and do not resolve the dispute among the parties as to the
precise scope of an official’s immunity at common law.59
The Court continued, ‘we do not doubt that in some circumstances the im-
munity of the foreign state extends to an individual for acts taken in his official
capacity. But it does not follow from this premise that Congress intended to
codify that immunity in the FSIA.’60 The Court maintained unanimity by
declining to define the ‘precise scope’ of official immunity (since the question
presented related only to the proper interpretation of the FSIA), leaving the in-
terpretation and application of the common law of official immunity in the
first instance to the lower courts.61 The ICJ’s decision does little to inform the
common law of foreign official immunity following Samantar, but it does re-
inforce the Samantar court’s distinction between the immunity of officials and
the immunity of foreign states.
The US State Department, which claims that the Executive Branch has exclu-
sive authority to make foreign official immunity determinations in proceedings
brought in US courts, has taken the position that ‘determinations of official
immunity are derivative of, but not identical to, determinations of state
immunity’.62 The State Department’s post-Samantar filings in civil suits include
a suggestion of immunity ratione personae for sitting Sri Lankan head of state
58 See C.I. Keitner, ‘Foreign Official ImmunityAfter Samantar’, 44 Vand. JTL (2011) 843.
59 Samantar, supra note 53, at 2290.
60 Ibid., at 2290^2291.
61 This was the approach urged by professors of public international law and comparative law as
amici curiae, whom I represented. See C.I. Keitner, ‘Annotated Brief of Professors of Public
International Law and Comparative Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents in
Samantar v. Yousuf’, 15 Lewis & Clark Law Review (2011) 609.
62 See H.H. Koh, ‘Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar: A United States Government
Perspective’, 44 Vand. JTL (2011) 1141, at 1148.
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Mahinda Rajapaksa,63 a suggestion of immunity ratione personae for sitting
Rwandan head of state Paul Kagame,64 a statement of interest and suggestion
of immunity from a third-party deposition subpoena for former Colombian
President Alvaro Uribe,65 and a suggestion of immunity ratione materiae for
former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo.66 The principles underlying the
State Department’s suggestions of ratione materiae immunity (or lack thereof)
to date remain somewhat opaque, underscoring the difficulty of combining
a principled approach to the imposition of personal responsibility with the
pragmatic necessity of conducting international relations.67
5. Concluding Remarks
It would be expedient to adopt the position advocated by some that individuals
who act on behalf of states are always entitled to the state’s immunity from
civil and criminal proceedings, absent an explicit waiver by the foreign state.
This is not, however, the current position of the US government, and it does
not reflect the current state of customary international law. That said, uncer-
tainty about the parameters of conduct-based immunity persists.
The view that it cannot be within the scope of an official’s functions to
commit an international crime is normatively appealing, but it does not
address the question whether one state should be able to adjudicate the lawful-
ness of conduct performed by another state’s official. From the perspective of
developing structural rules of international law, the challenge is to identify
principles that will minimize the risk of unwarranted or politically motivated
proceedings while at the same time preserving the ability to deter and punish
violations.
The ICC cannot be the sole institution responsible for imposing personal
responsibility for serious international law violations where an official’s home
63 Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the United States, Manoharan v. Rajapaksa, Civil Action
No. 11-235 (CKK), 13 January 2012, available online at http://www.tamilnet.com/img/publish/
2012/01/SUGGESTION_OF_IMMUNITY_SUBMITTED_BY_THE_UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA.pdf
(visited 20 July 2012).
64 Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the United States, Habyarimana v. Kagame, Civil Action
No. 10-437-W, 29 August 2011, available online at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/Kagame-suggestion-of-immunity1.pdf (visited 20 July 2012).
65 Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity of and by the United States of America
Regarding the Deposition of Former President Uribe, Giraldo v. Drummond Co., Civil Action
No. 1:10 MC 00764 (JDB), 31 March 2011, available online at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/
colombia/doc/reuribe1.html (visited 20 July 2012).
66 Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the United States of America, Doe v. Zedillo,
No. 3:11-cv-01433-AWT, 7 September 2012, available online at http://www.lawfareblog.com/
wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Suggestion-of-Immunity-2.pdf (visited 10 October 2012).
67 For a critique, see D.P. Stewart, ‘Samantar and the Future of Foreign Official Immunity’, 15 Lewis
& Clark Law Review (2011) 633, at 662^663, arguing that ‘from the perspective of the orderly
and principled development of the international law of foreign official immunity, a clear under-
standing of the U.S. government’s position would be beneficial’.
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state is unwilling or unable to do so. Some possibility of horizontal enforce-
ment is needed, as recognized by the idea of universal jurisdiction. Horizontal
enforcement by states with some connection or nexus to the underlying con-
duct may seem more legitimate than so-called ‘foreign cubed’cases (when a for-
eign plaintiff brings a claim against a foreign defendant relating to foreign
conduct); however, too much of a connection can lead to accusations of polit-
ical trials or victor’s justice. Ratione materiae immunity can do some, but cer-
tainly not all, of the work allocating adjudicatory authority in the midst of
such varied interests.
Further judicial analyses of jurisdictional immunities by national and re-
gional courts and other bodies will shape their interpretation and evolution
over time. Andrea Bianchi has observed with regard to legal interpretation
that ‘[l]’ambigu|« te¤ ne concerne alors pas seulement la function de l’interpre' te, mais
aussi les buts de l’ordre juridique qu’il est cense¤ interpreter’ [the ambiguity does
not only concern the role of the interpreter, but also the goals of the juridical
order that the interpreter is meant to interpret].68 The ICJ’s task is complicated
by the competing goals it may be asked to serve. Judges Higgins, Kooijmans
and Buergenthal observed in their joint separate opinion in the ArrestWarrant
case that ‘[t]he difficult task that international law today faces is to provide
that stability in international relations by a means other than the impunity of
those responsible for major human rights violations’.69 Balancing the poten-
tially competing demands of stability and accountability remains an important
challenge for both international and domestic courts.
In Germany v. Italy, the ICJ saw its primary role as the guardian of postwar
stability. It thus cut short the period of experimentation of national courts in
the area of state immunity, in the name of international stability. In contrast,
some experimentation in the area of foreign official immunity ought to be
allowed to continue, so that the structural rules governing horizontal enforce-
ment can evolve in response to the needs for both order and justice at the
national and international levels.
68 See Bianchi, supra note 11, at 99.
69 Joint Separate Opinion, x5.
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